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ABSTRACT 
Since extremely powerful technologies are now available to 
generate and process digital images, there is a concomitant 
need for developing techniques to distinguish the original 
images from the altered ones, the genuine ones from the 
doctored ones. In this paper we focus on this problem and 
propose a method based on the neighbor bit planes of the 
image.  The basic idea is that, the correlation between the bit 
planes as well the binary texture characteristics within the 
bit planes will differ between an original and a doctored 
image. This change in the intrinsic characteristics of the im-
age can be monitored via the quantal-spatial moments of the 
bit planes. These so-called Binary Similarity Measures are 
used as features in classifier design. It has been shown that 
the linear classifiers based on BSM features can detect with 
satisfactory reliability most of the image doctoring executed 
via Photoshop tool.  
Keywords: Digital image forensics, image processing, bi-
nary similarity measures, classification. 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
The advances in digital technologies have given birth to 
very sophisticated and low-cost tools that are now integral 
parts of information processing. This trend brought with it 
new challenges concerning the integrity and authenticity of 
digital documents, in particular images. The most challeng-
ing of these is that digital images can now be easily created, 
edited and manipulated without leaving any obvious traces 
of having been modified. As a consequence, one can no 
longer take the authenticity of images for granted, especially 
when it comes to legal photographic evidence. Image foren-
sics, in this context, is concerned with determining the 
source and potential authenticity of a digital image.  
Digital watermarks can serve in a scheme to authenticate 
images. However, presently the overwhelming majority of 
images that circulate in the media and Internet do not con-
tain a digital watermark. Hence in the absence of widespread 
adoption of digital watermarks or concurrently with it, we 
believe it is necessary to develop image forensic techniques. 
We define image forensics as the art of reconstituting the set 
of processing operations, called overall doctoring, that the 
image has been subjected to. In turn these techniques will 
enable us to make statements about the origin, veracity and 
nature of digital images.  
In a prior work [6], we studied the same problem of reliably 
discriminating between “doctored” images (images which 
are altered in order to deceive people) from untampered 
original ones. The detection scheme was based on training a 
classifier based on certain image quality features, called also 
“generalized moments”. Scaling, rotation, brightness ad-
justment, blurring, enhancement etc. or some particular 
combinations of them are typical examples of doctoring. A 
frequent image manipulation involves the pasting of another 
image, skillfully manipulated so to avoid any suspicion. 
Since the image manipulations can be very subtle to eschew 
detection, the discriminating features can be easily over-
whelmed by the variation in the image content. It is, thus, 
very desirable to obtain features that remain independent of 
the image content, so that they would only reflect the pres-
ence, if any, of image manipulations.  
2.  BINARY SIMILARITY MEASURES  
We assume that altering an image changes the correlation 
between and within bit planes. Therefore the quantal-spatial 
correlation between the bit planes of the original image will 
differ from that of the bit planes of the doctored images. 
Consequently certain statistical features extracted from the 
bit planes of images can be instrumental in revealing the 
presence of image manipulations. Since each bit plane is 
also a binary image, we start by considering similarity 
measures between two binary images. These measures, 
called Binary Similarity Measures (BSM) were previously 
employed in the context of image steganalysis.[1, 3]. In this 
paper we measure the correlation between bit planes num-
bered 3-4, 4-5, 5-6, 6-7 and 7-8 for the red channel and bit 
planes 5-5 of the red and blue channels. 
Classical measures are based on the bit-by-bit matching 
between the corresponding pixel positions of the two im-
ages. Typically, such measures are obtained from the scores 
based on a contingency table (or matrix of agreement) 
summed over all the pixels in an image. In this study, we 
have found that it is more relevant to make comparison 
based on binary texture statistics. Let 
{} K k x k i i , , 1    , l = = − x  and  {} K k y k i i , , 1    , l = = − y  be the sequences of bits representing the K-neighborhood pixels, 
where the index i runs over all the MxN image pixels.  For 
K=4 we obtain the four stencil neighbors and for K=8 we 
obtain the 8 neighbors. Let  
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These four variables {a,b,c,d} can be interpreted as the one-
step co-occurrence values of the binary images.  Obviously 
these co-occurrences are defined for a specific bit plane b, 
though the bit plane parameter was not shown for the sake 
simplicity.  Normalizing the histograms of the agreement 
scores for the b
th bit-plane (where now  ()
jj
ii b aa = ) one 
obtains for the j’th co-occurrence: 
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In addition to these we calculate the Ojala [4] texture meas-
ures as follows. For each binary image on the b
th bit-plane we 
obtain a 256-bin histogram based on the weighted K=8 
neighborhood as in Fig. 1. For each 8-neighborhood pattern, 
the histogram bin numbered  ∑
=
− =
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2
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i
k i x n  is augmented 
by one.    
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Fig. 1 (a) The weighting of the neighbors in the computa-
tion of Ojala score. (b) An example: Ojala score 
S=2+16+32+128=178  
 
Let the two normalized histograms be denoted as 
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b b = . The resulting Ojala 
measure is the mutual entropy between the two distributions 
belonging to adjacent planes b and b+1:                        
∑
=
+ − =
N
n
b
n
b
n b S S m
1
1 log .                    (5) 
Table I. Binary Similarity Measures  
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We have used three types of binary similarity measures be-
tween bit planes as in Table 1.  
First group:. The measures m1 to m9 are obtained for 
neighbor bits separately by applying the parameters mo-
ments {a,b,c,d} in (3) to the binary string similarity 
measures, such as Sokal & Sneath.  
Second group: The differences 
1
ii i dm m m
ββ + =−  
13 , , 10 l = i  are used as the final measures.   
Third group:  Measures dm14-dm17  are the neighborhood-
weighting mask proposed by Ojala [4].  3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We computed binary similarity measures as features and used 
Sequential Floating Forward Search (SFFS) algorithm to 
select the best features [5] and we have used Linear Regres-
sion Classifier for classification [7]. In our experiments we 
have built a database of 200 images. These images were 
taken with Canon Powershot S200 camera. Notice that the 
images that were taken from the same camera in order to 
detect alterations, but not the properties due to the camera 
characteristics.  
The image alterations we experimented with were scaling-up, 
rotation, brightness adjustment, blurring and sharpening, all 
implemented via Adobe Photoshop [8]. Half of the images 
were used for training and the remaining in testing. In [2], 
Farid et al. employed a higher order statistical model to dis-
criminate natural images from unnatural ones. We have 
adopted their method, so that we did the same tests once with 
their features and then with our features. In the Table’s below 
the results according to features in [2] are denoted as “Farid”. 
First, we scaled-up all the images with the scales of %50, 
%25, %10, %5, %2, %1 and got 6 databases of 200 images. 
We trained a classifier on each database and tested if an im-
age is original or scaled-up. The results are in Table II. 
 
Table II. The performance for image scaling-up attack.  
Scaling-
up 
Method False  Posi-
tive 
False 
Negative 
Accuracy 
(%) 
BSM 2/100 0/100 99 
Farid 4/100  11/100 92.5 
 
%50 
Farid 5/100  11/100 92 
BSM  18/100 3/100 89.5   
%10  Farid 4/100  17/100 89.5 
BSM 25/100 4/100 85.5 
Farid 4/100  14/100 91 
 
%5 
Farid 8/100 21/100 85.5 
BSM 32/100 8/100 80   
%1  Farid  17/100  12/100 85.5 
 
We rotated the images 45°, 30°, 15°, 5°, 1°. Corresponding 
results are in Table III. 
 
Table III. The performance for rotation attack. 
Rotation Method False  Posi-
tive 
False 
Negative 
Accuracy 
(%) 
BSM 2/100 0/100 99   
%50  Farid 4/100  11/100 92.5 
BSM 7/100 0/100 96.5   
%25  Farid 5/100  11/100 92 
BSM  18/100 3/100 89.5   
%10  Farid 4/100  17/100 89.5 
BSM 25/100 4/100 85.5   
%5  Farid 4/100  14/100 91 
BSM 27/100 7/100 83   
%2  Farid 8/100 21/100 85.5 
 
We adjusted the brightness of the images with the scales of  
40, 25, 15, 5. Corresponding results are in Table IV. 
Table IV. The performance for brightness adjustment attack. 
Brightness 
Adjustment 
Method False 
Positive 
False 
Negative 
Accuracy 
(%) 
BSM  17/100 27/100 78   
40  Farid 60/100 28/100 58 
BSM  13/100 32/100 77.5   
25  Farid 61/100 26/100 56.5 
BSM  19/100 28/100 76.5   
15  Farid 67/100 27/100 53.5 
BSM  18/100 45/100 68.5   
5  Farid 59/100 39/100 51 
 
We use Gaussian blur to blur the images with the scales of 1, 
0.5, 0.3, 0.1. Corresponding results are represented in Table-
V. 
Table V. The performance for blurring attack. 
Blurring Method False 
Positive 
False 
Negative 
Accu-
racy (%) 
BSM  1/100 0/100 99.5   
1.0  Farid 0/100 7/100 96.5 
BSM 2/100 0/100 99   
0.5  Farid 81/100  1/100 59 
BSM 46/100 22/100 66   
0.3  Farid 49/100 38/100 56.5 
BSM 24/100 62/100 57   
0.1  Farid 69/100 31/100 50 
 
We sharpen the images and train a classifier to distinguish the 
sharpened ones from the original ones. In Table VI, we show 
the results of the sharpening classifier. 
 
Table VI. The performance for sharpening attack. 
Method False 
Positive 
False 
Negative 
Accuracy 
(%) 
BSM 4/100 9/100 93.5 
 
 
Sharpening 
Farid 36/100  19/100 72.5 
 
As shown in the tables we trained more than one classifier 
for each image alteration type at different settings of attack 
strength. However, it is not practical to devise a separate 
classifier for each setting; hence we trained one classifier per 
alteration type to operate in a range of attack strengths. For 
example we generate an image pool with 50 images from 
%25, %10, %5, and % 2 scaled-up. We used half of the im-
ages for training and remained for testing. The results for 
generic classifier for various image alteration types are given 
in Table VII. 
To test an image on only one classifier we made an image 
pool by adding the same quantity of images that are scaled up 
with the scales of  %50, %25, %10, %5, scaled down %50, 
%25, %10, %5, rotated 45°, 30°, 15°, 5°, contrast enhanced 
with the scales of  25,15,5, brightness adjusted with the 
scales of 15, 25, blurred with the scales of  0.3, 0.5 and 
sharpened. Again half of the images were used for training 
and the remaining for testing. We call this classifier as ge-
neric-generic classifier. Corresponding results for this classi-
fier is shown in Table VIII. 
 Table VII. The performance of generic classifiers.  
Image Altera-
tion Type 
Method False 
Positive 
False 
Negative 
Accu-
racy (%) 
BSM  12/100 3/100 92.5  Scaling Up 
Farid 6/100  17/100 88.5 
BSM 29/100  13/100 79  Scaling Down 
Farid  17/100  18/100 82.5 
BSM  13/100 45/100 71  Rotation 
Farid  16/100  14/100 85 
BSM  1/100 48/100 75.5  Contrast En-
hancement  Farid 79/100  13/100 54 
BSM 3/100 46/100 75.5  Brightness 
Adjustment  Farid 76/100  17/100 53.5 
BSM 6/100  18/100 88  Blurring 
Farid 80/100 4/100 58 
 
 
 Table VIII. The performance of generic-generic classifiers.  
Method  False Positive  False Negative  Accuracy (%) 
BSM 21/100 28/100 75.5 
Farid  15/100 31/100 77 
 
To make our results more realistic, we addressed the testing 
of  “doctored images”. We doctored 20 images by either in-
serting extra content or replacing the original content. To 
make them look like natural and avoid any suspicion, the 
inserted content was resized, rotated or brightness adjusted 
etc, before pasting it to the image. We take 2 untampered and 
one tampered block from every image, so we had 40 untam-
pered and 20 tampered blocks. We tested these blocks on 
generic classifiers. We accept it as tampered if any of the 
generic classifiers declare it as tampered. In Table IX the 
results for the image blocks on generic classifiers are shown. 
 
Table IX. The perf. of generic classifiers for image blocks. 
Method  False Positive  False Negative  Accuracy (%) 
BSM 9/40  2/20  81.67 
Farid 40/40  0/20  33.3 
 
And we tested the same blocks on generic - generic classifi-
ers. The corresponding results are in Table X.  
 
Table X. The perf. of generic classifiers for image blocks. 
Method  False Positive  False Negative  Accuracy (%) 
BSM 8/40  4/20  80 
Farid 9/40  8/20  71.67 
 
We capture 100 images from Internet that can easily be tam-
pered. We tested these images on generic and generic - ge-
neric classifiers. The results are shown in Table XI and Table 
XII. 
 
Table XI. The performance of generic classifiers for image 
blocks that are captured from Internet. 
Method  False Negative  Accuracy  
BSM 9/100 91 
Farid 0/100  100 
Table XII. The performance of generic-generic classifiers for 
image blocks that are captured from internet. 
 
Method  False Negative  Accuracy (%) 
BSM 48/100 52 
Farid 47/100 53 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we proposed a method for digital image fo-
rensics, based on Binary Similarity Measures between bit 
planes used as features. Then we designed several classifiers 
to test the tampered or un-tampered status of the images. The 
performance results in detecting and differentiating a host of 
attacks were encouraging as we were able to discriminate a 
doctored image from its original with a reasonable accuracy. 
We have assessed our methods vis-à-vis the closest competi-
tor image forensic detector in [2]. We outperform Farid’s 
detector especially in contrast enhancement and brightness 
adjustment attacks. On the other hand, while we have better 
performance at stronger levels of manipulations, Farid out-
performs us at weaker levels.  In this respect, the two 
schemes seem to be complementary; hence fusion of forensic 
detectors at feature level or decision level must be envi-
sioned.  
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